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Note: This is mainly a thought piece on the nature of necessity and emergency. For
more information on any of the footnotes (sadly, they are not up to snuff even at this late
date) or concepts referenced please contact me at jacquelinehunsicker@gmail.com. It is
also worth saying that if you are aware of a German constitutional scholar looking for a
coauthor on this style of piece, let me know. Happy reading!

The Emergency Powers of the Judiciary, or Necessity and German Constitutionalism
We live in a world that Carl Schmitt might have characterized as a constant state
of exception. When under siege from non-state actors who are seldom caught, traditional
nation-states and newer confederations of those states are often at a loss about what to do,
except that they know they must not allow the terrorists to win, to paraphrase the former
President of the United States of America, George W. Bush. Winning, in this case,
would be for those enemies to triumph over countries with ways akin to our own.
However, what can oftentimes be overlooked in periods of crisis is that in order to win,
sometimes the leader, the general, the executive—whomever—is willing to sell his
nation’s soul for the sake of that winning, that is to say, change the constitution of its
people. By constitution I mean not only any formal document, but the way in which
constitutional orders allow the citizens that live under them to live their lives relatively
freely with guarantees of the rule of law, various rights, and other common aspects of
modern liberal constitutional democracies.

1

Some might ask: why would a leader undermine his constitution, much less his
people? In the best cases, we will assume he does it unconsciously, thinking that he is a
savior not a destroyer. In the worst cases, we will assume ambitions already formed to
topple the reigning regime, and condemn him for maltreating his peoples’ trust. But one
would imagine, particularly in a world increasingly made up of democratic regimes, that
leaders fall between those categories—those somewhat excusable but dangerously
unwitting fools who make sacrifices without imagining any of their consequences on one
hand and conspiratorial and criminal frauds on the other. This middle group would
consist of rather well intentioned albeit often somewhat inept leaders who believe that the
crisis of “their” time is a crisis far worse than those that preceded it and thus warrants
their stepping out of their bindings—the constitutional order—in the name of saving it,
but who do ultimately hope to save that order for the future. Even unpopular leaders may
one day imagine monuments and tributes to their names, once the dust of history has
cleared so that future generations can see the debt they owe to the past (see George W.
Bush’s comparison of himself to Truman). Nevertheless, it will be my aim to
demonstrate that the executive is unlikely to be the best safeguard of constitutional orders
with regards to rights. The executive is too prone to see himself as above the
constitutional order that instated him, partially because, for better and for worse, the
executive is often called to act quickly in the face of danger.
The actions of legislative bodies in times of crisis often serve to help the
executive in tearing down constitutional norms. First, there is overwhelming tendency in
the face of crisis to, as American political scientists call it, “rally around the flag” and
create a united front between the executive and legislature. Second, as one of the key
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pieces of the legislature’s mandate is to act as proxy for the citizens it represents, acting
on the fear of the citizenry—often in concert with the executive—can be interpreted as
part of their job description. Legislators are, to be sure, further removed from the
immediacy of crises, but this deprives most legislators of developing the skills for
proactive thought and promotes retroactive thought—meaning, they think better once the
crisis has been dealt with preliminarily, and thus their hands are tied in ways that make
them less than ideal for preserving the constitutional order in the long run (cite Tulis).
Most examples of judicial action—or, rather, inaction—in the immediate
aftermath of crises (see Lincoln and ex parte cases, Korematsu) do not inspire confidence
that courts could be at all effective in arresting the sorts of constitutional changes brought
on by crises. Courts are widely perceived as ineffective even as symbols (Rosenberg),
much less as powerful enough institutions to combat executive and/or legislative
overreaching, being prone to be taken over by special interests themselves (Hirschl).
What’s more, many would argue that judicial action that claims to preserve the
constitution against elected representatives of the people could be far worse than judicial
inaction (Bickel, Horowitz, Manfredi).
Yet there is an arena in which action by constitutional courts is largely recognized
as legitimate: the protection of rights. Although constitutions are far more than the rights
that they protect in the narrow sense, in a much broader sense, constitutions are meant
solely to protect rights. The rule of law is the right of man under the social contract
(Locke). Freedom from tyranny—tyranny that is often exercised when institutions like
the separation of powers and stability of law are threatened—is a right (American
founders, Lon Fuller). Rights of this sort, often referred to as “first-generation” rights,
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are unquestioned by modern liberal democratic orders. More and more, “second” and
“third” generation rights—those including the rights to human dignity, freedom from
oppression on a much wider scope, education, health care, and human fulfillment—are
being enforced by courts, particularly in advanced democracies outside of the United
States. If protection of these rights is seen as the purview of constitutional courts even by
people who do not elect the members of those courts, then it seems possible—and
perhaps even reasonable—to imagine that said courts could indeed protect these rights in
times of crisis.
Passing this responsibility to courts is not ideal. Ideally, all branches of
government would have a Lincolnian understanding of protecting the constitution and all
branches would be involved. Unfortunately, with courts being allowed to increase their
powers of adjudication in many different arenas also comes the idea that executives and
legislatures can act and then simply wait for the true authority on constitutions to step in
and correct any problems. Undoubtedly this cripples not just the care executives and
legislatures take in upholding the constitutions that supposedly rule over them, but also
the image these bodies show to the people. This, surely, is not the only reason for overly
litigious societies like America, for it is obvious that much of that is people wanting what
they want when they want it and abusing their legal rights to get ahead, but I would
imagine that having the court seen as the most likely protector of individual rights and the
constitution itself does propel more individuals in crisis towards the court rather than
their local representative.
These are serious problems, but in examining the interplay between different state
actors, it does appear that constitutional courts may still have the best ability to safeguard
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the constitution—if only because most people think that it is the court’s responsibility to
tell the people what the constitution means. Even if the idea of a court having such a
heavy responsibility in that area is a myth, it is still a powerful one. Even though courts
are not seen as impartial as they were a century ago, even those who feel they have been
slighted by judicial ideology have abandoned neither the legal system nor the constitution
that established it.
In reading Schmitt, we find a surprisingly compelling, yet terribly frightening,
account of what a state’s response to emergencies should be. But what, as the Austrian
mathematician, Kurt Gödel asked 1, prevents our order from being reconstituted by a new
decision by an ambitious sovereign-esque executive? Who prevents the kind of human
rights catastrophes seen not merely in Guantanamo Bay, but in the Nazi concentration
camps Giorgi Agamben emphasizes in his Homo Sacer?
This is of particular importance given the consensus in political theory and history
from the Greeks to present that Schmitt is correct in stating “Like every other order, the
legal order rests on a decision and not on a norm” (9). We are well aware that
Machiavelli’s Romulus and Brutus made decisions to create the Roman kingship and

1

Kurt Gödel famously was on the brink of attaining U.S. citizenship when he discovered
that the Constitution could not prevent its own degeneration into dictatorship. It was
largely the influence of Einstein and Morgenstern that kept him in line during his
citizenship tests. See Morgenstern’s memorandum to this fact at:
http://1372721354610204262-a-jeffreykegler-com-ssites.googlegroups.com/a/jeffreykegler.com/morgensterndocument/Home/files/Morgenstern_onGoedelcitizenship.pdf?attredirects=0&auth=ANo
Y7cp-XyOzuqLWrtZGqkKH8QWa5x6KwF_UYec2JOo783bbH4_kfVTGm2mgPgdTfv7z2tl_MjsAPyr9tO_M0IzfxbkEVcr0r5g6Zf8K
XUMoI2MzbnvjbHe09SyS_gMrWz1vjudKsmphykzF12BI27pD_F321Xow38F7F9f8g18DEp5QZ2V37bI51mj-ZvA0ZUHlJJHoYlEA3LhIlkxtNs9w0awLRk3c80bOrzwAZc1JO3SN3p_0G9O4LLl3LTpZ6M_wzvkS3
(Accessed 6 April 2009)
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republic respectively, just as we are aware that the rebelling colonists in the American
colonies, whose position is well represented by Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of
Independence, were guided by a decision, not a norm. Perhaps more perturbing is that
the founders in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were also acting as decisionists,
largely led by James Madison, to abandon the norms established in the Articles of
Confederation.
Despite the decisionist elements of American constitutionalism, however, it seems
fair to say that we are still governed by fairly strong norms and that decisions are not
univocal from one sovereign, coming rather from the President and various executive
agencies, Congress, and the Supreme Court, as well as various state and local organs.
What I have written above is more than a mere introduction to the importance of
Schmitt and Agamben, but also to the key question here: is there an institution in
government that can be deployed to separate power so that a sovereign executive cannot
effectively become Schmittian, thus preventing the catastrophes Agamben devotes his
work to explaining? Perhaps high constitutional courts might be best placed to curtail
this problem of the executive, provided that the court is endowed with enough historical
and practical power to rouse the consciousness of the people to prevent them from being
bamboozled by Schmittian executives. It is not in America that I find such a court,
because the Supreme Court usually denounces executive overreaching too long after the
crime has been committed to be effective, but rather in Germany.
German history, which includes the Weimar era battle between Schmittian
existential constitutionalism and Hans Kelsen’s legal positivist model, the rise of Hitler
(and Schmitt’s support of Hitler as sovereign), the horrors of the concentration camps,

6

and finally the creation of a sort of Kantian Basic Law, provides a potential alternative to
the more open American court system. As a result, I believe it is important to consider
whether provisions like Article 2 of the Basic Law, which ensures the fundamental right
to human dignity to all Germans, might be able to arrest the biopolitical human rights
collapse that Agamben projects will happen in modern democratic orders. This is not to
say that Germany is perfect or totally inclusive (their treatment of the Turkish people
within their borders is evidence enough of that), but that their constitutional order and the
power of their Constitutional Court might be able to stop terrible excesses of the German
Chancellor.
A recent German Constitutional Court case that shows this possibility is what I
will refer to as the German Aviation Case (Judgment 15 February 2006—1BvR 357/05). 2
This case calls into question the constitutionality of several provisions of the Aviation
Security Act, whose §14.3 allows
direct use of armed force against the aircraft is permissible only if the occurrence
of an especially grave accident cannot be prevented even by such measures. This,
however, only applies where it must be assumed under the circumstances that the
aircraft is intended to be used as a weapon against human lives, and where the
direct use of armed force is the only means to avert this danger (Grounds A:14).
This provision allows the Chancellor or the Federal Minister of Defense to authorize
shooting down airplanes thought to be weapons against human lives, and allows them to
sacrifice the human lives on board to do so. The Court rules
33. 1. The constitutional complain is admissible. The complainants’
fundamental rights are directly violated by the challenged regulation. Because
they frequently use planes for private and professional reasons, the possibility that
they could be affected by a measure pursuant to §14.3 of the Aviation Security act
is not merely a theoretical one.
2

This case can be found in English at
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rs20060215_1bvr035705en.html
7

34. 2. The constitutional complaint is also well-founded. The Aviation Security
Act infringes the complainants’ fundamental rights to human dignity and to life
pursuant to Article 1.1 and Article 2.2 sentence 1 of Basic Law. The Act makes
them mere objects of state action. The value and preservation of their lives are
left to the discretion of the Federal Minister of Defense according to quantitative
aspects and to the life span presumably remaining to them ‘under the
circumstances. In the case of an emergency, they are intended to be sacrificed
and to intentionally be killed if the Minister presumes, on the basis of the
information available to him or her, that their lives will only last a short time and
that, in comparison with the losses which are imminent otherwise, they therefore
are no longer of any value at all or are, at any rate, of reduced value (emphasis
mine, citations included in text).
Sections 35 and 36 reiterate the same concerns—namely, that the prioritization of some
lives over other lives is thoroughly unacceptable and legally incompatible with human
dignity. As I see it, this ruling is a repudiation of Agamben’s claim that all democratic
states have reduced their citizens to living as homo sacer (14). Some might say that the
decision of the Court is the same as the decision of an executive, and that this result,
though far more palatable than decisions made by Schmittian executives, is nothing more
than a new mold for the sovereign. But I believe this is not the case. If my preliminary
analysis of the German system is correct, then the court does have actual power. If so,
neither Chancellor and Ministers, nor Parliament, nor Court can be the sovereign: they
divide power amongst themselves, some winning some struggles, others not.
Decisionism is therefore impossible with the existence of checking institutions imbued
with actual power.
In the end, though I am well aware that it may be the case that neither American
nor German courts are well suited to combat the problems inherent to liberal
constitutionalism announced by Carl Schmitt, it also appears that we cannot just ignore
his incisive analysis and hope for the best. This is especially true if we consider
arguments like Michael Paulsen’s, where the executive is seen as even more powerful
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than current politicians would admit. As Paulsen argues: “The Constitution itself
embraces an overriding principle of construction for the document’s specific provisions
that may even, in cases of extraordinary necessity, trump specific constitutional
requirements” (Gross and Aolian, 50). Furthermore, “in that respect, necessity is not
only part of the constitutional order. It is ‘the first and originary source of law’” (Gross
and Aolain, 50). If Paulsen is correct, then the German lawmakers were right to give the
executive such extreme power.
The question then becomes one of prioritization of rights and survival, which is
the basic balance in the German Aviation case. Should a country protect itself from
terrorists (assuming, of course, that the method the Bundestag invented would actually
work, which is in question), or protect fundamental human rights? Furthermore, is there
a balancing test that could be applied that would improve our chances of being able to
achieve both ends? Paulsen proposes such a test, saying that the executive power should
have the equivalent of the Court’s balancing tests when necessity compels the executive
to go outside of the law. As he states, however, “Unfortunately, however, what the courts
hold sufficient to constitution such a ‘compelling interest’ often falls well short of what
one might think to be true necessity, in the sense of an urgent need to protect the nation or
its people from devastating events” (Paulsen, 1286). This means in Paulsen’s schematic
that the Court’s protecting basic human rights, such as in the German Aviation Case, has
analogous tests with the executive.
The question we are left with from Paulsen’s analysis, as well as the decision
from the Bundestag, is what is necessity? How can we know a situation reaches that
threshold, and who should be the constitutional actor to remedy the situation? I have
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argued here that in the case of rights, the constitutional courts should have jurisdiction,
but only protection of rights does not a legal system make.
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